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Abstract: The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate
about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is
limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative,
even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments
independently  of  each  other,  and  if  all  the  judgments  are  based  on
the  same  source  of  (good)  evidence.  In  this  paper  I  demonstrate  this
limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general
result. I pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model
of  evidence  and  expert  judgment  in  order  to  give  a  precise  account  of
the basic problem.
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Surprises can be useful in epistemology. Epistemology is most
helpful when it leads to normative recommendations that are
surprising in that they are counterintuitive or in contradiction
with established practice (Miriam Solomon 2006, 30).
Seeking and utilising the advice of experts is a very common and useful
practice in a complex world; this is especially so given the ever-
increasing stream of information, which no single individual can
comprehend and process entirely on her own. We regularly ask experts
for  advice.  And  in  many  cases  we  ask  different  experts  for  their
independent advice on one and the same issue. If we, for instance, fear a
serious disease we may well ask several medical specialists for their
diagnoses. But what if the diagnoses given are inconsistent?
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How should and how do we actually cope with disagreement among
experts? In an explorative paper Alvin Goldman (2001) investigates what
good reasons a novice might have for trusting one putative expert more
than another. He first presents a (non-exhaustive) list of such reasons.
According to the second entry in his list, Goldman’s advice to the
layman  confronted  with  conflicting  expert  judgments  is  to  check  for
“agreement from additional putative experts on one side of the subject
in question” (Goldman 2001, 93).
As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  piece  of  advice  is  the  one  Goldman
discusses most extensively in his paper. He gives the following formal
argument:
Goldman’s proposition. If expert judgments are sufficiently reliable
and independent of each other, then additional experts confirming
some proposition φ add positive credibility to φ (Goldman 2001,
99-101).
The reader may be somewhat disappointed about this result. It does
not seem to suit the needs of a layperson confronted with conflicting
expert judgments very well. What we would rather have is something
like this:
Proposition (*). If  expert  judgments  are  sufficiently  reliable  and
independent of each other, then φ is more probably true than not, if
the number of experts confirming φ exceeds the number of experts
confirming ¬φ.
The idea that the majority of expert judgments may play a decisive
role as a basis of informed decisions appears very natural to us. This is
somewhat reflected in the vast literature on the aggregation of opinions
in psychology and management science (see Budescu 2006; Yaniv 2004
for  overviews).  There  is  much  evidence  to  suggest  that  people
predominantly use simple averaging rules to aggregate information
from multiple sources. Averaging has recently also become salient in the
debate about swarm intelligence and the wisdom of crowds.1 In the case
1 See,  most  prominently,  Surowiecki  2004. Exploiting the wisdom of crowds
presupposes some sort of aggregation of the information dispersed across the crowd.
Most of the cases Surowiecki discusses are—like the classic Galton example—cases of
simple averaging. The other aggregation procedure prominently mentioned is the
market price (e.g., on the stock market) as a representation of a collective assessment
of  expected  value  or  success  (chapter  11).  On  one  occasion  Surowiecki  refers  to
Bayesian updating (pp. xx-xxi), but the case discussed is a Bayesian search based on
an aggregate expert opinion. How this aggregate opinion is produced is not specified
(but it does not seem to be itself based on some form of Bayesian updating).
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of  a  categorical  binary  judgment  (e.g.,  whether  or  not  a  surgery  is
needed to cure a disease), assigning equal weight to the independent
judgments of various experts and then averaging them amounts to
following the advice of the majority (Yaniv 2004, 76).
In social epistemology, the rediscovery of Condorcet’s jury theorem2
eventually made the majority rule a standard reference point in the
debate about the demands of epistemic rationality when merging the
opinions of independent judges, and in other places such as the recent
debate  about  the  so-called  discursive  dilemma  (Kornhauser  and  Sager
1986, see discussion below).
Thus,  there  seem to  be  good reasons  to  consider  the  majority  rule
not  only  a  widely  used,  but  also  a  well-founded  guiding  principle  in
forming  an  opinion  on  the  basis  of  diverging  expert  judgments.
However,  a  claim  like  (*)  is  not  true  in  general  and  Goldman  is  well
advised not to make it! There are important cases in which the majority
just cannot decide on matters of truth, even though all judgments are
made independently by equally competent jurors with exactly the same
opportunity to obtain information on the issue. The object of this paper
is  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  these  cases,  mainly  by  presenting  a
simple counterexample.
Within  the  theory  of  judgment  aggregation  (see  List  2012  for  an
overview) it has been acknowledged that simply following the majority
of judgments is not necessarily optimal if truth is the object. The main
reason for this is that a rational decision maker would consider
that  judgments  are  given  by  individuals  with  different  degrees  of
competence.  Consequently,  the  judgments  of  individuals  should  be
differently weighted according to their competence and/or other
qualities of the individual and her informational resources, which might
influence the reliability of her judgment. In what follows, my argument
presupposes that  all  individuals are equally  competent and that  all  are
in essentially the same position to obtain relevant information on the
matter at hand; thus all judgments should be assigned the same weight.
Nevertheless, following the majority of judgments will turn out to be
suboptimal.
The argument in this paper is related to more general findings
from the literature on ‘opinion pooling’ (Dietrich and List 2014). This
literature is concerned with aggregating opinions, which are represented
2 Condorcet  1785  did  not  explicitly  formulate  the  theorem in  his  famous  essay.  The
basic proposition was first explicitly stated by Duncan Black (1958).
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by an assignment of probability to some proposition. ‘Linear pooling’
determines the average of the—possibly weighted—individual opinions
as  the  correct  collective  opinion  and  corresponds  to  the  majority  rule
in judgment aggregation. Franz Dietrich and Christian List (2014) argue
that  this  procedure  is  suboptimal  as  a  truth-tracking  procedure.  Their
reasoning is that collective opinions generated by linear pooling may
not adequately incorporate the whole body of  information upon which
individual opinions rest.
I will use Bayesian updating here as the benchmark of truth tracking.
This corresponds to an opinion aggregation procedure known as ‘supra-
Bayesian opinion pooling’ (Morris 1974), which Dietrich and List refer to
at  the  end  of  their  survey,  but  do  not  discuss  in  detail.  Their  reason
for  not  engaging  thoroughly  with  this  procedure  is  that  it  rests  on
unrealistic assumptions that pertain to the information available to
individuals. Rather than to formulate a consistent theory of judgment
aggregation, my aim in this paper is to challenge the majority rule as
it is used in epistemic discourse on judgment aggregation. My argument
proceeds as follows:
I  will  begin  with  a  short  presentation  of  the  discursive  dilemma as
presently discussed. The goal is to identify hidden assumptions and
unquestioned premises that underwrite the majority rule as a guiding
principle in opinion aggregation. In subsequent sections, I present a
counterexample and the formal results—these serve to show that the
assumptions  of  majority  rule  are  by  no  means  indisputable.  However,
before presenting a counterexample the underlying problem must
be  articulated.  I  will,  therefore,  motivate  the  primary  argument  by
introducing a simple Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment.3
The paper concludes with some general remarks.
THE DISCURSIVE DILEMMA
In philosophical debates about epistemic rationality, the majority rule,
as  an  aggregation  procedure  for  judgment,  has  been  a  predominant
topic in the context of the so-called discursive dilemma. Here is a quote
and an example from a recent paper to illustrate the focus of this debate
(Pigozzi 2006, 285fn.):4
3 Goldman  (1999,  103-109)  introduces  a  similar  model  for  the  special  case  of
testimonial evidence.
4 The  problem  first  became  known  as  “the  doctrinal  paradox”  in  the  discipline  of
jurisprudence.  The example  given here  has  the  same logical  structure  as  the  original
example by Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager (1986).
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A  department  of  a  prestigious  university  offers  one  career
development fellowship to a candidate (proposition R) if and only if
the candidate proposed a good research project (P) and if she has
an  excellent  track  record  of  publication  (Q)  [...]  Suppose  that  there
are  three  members  in  the  departmental  committee.  Each  of  them
consistently casts her vote on R (the conclusion) depending on her
judgments  on  P  and  Q  (the  premises).  The  three  members  vote  as
shown in the table below.
P: Good project? Q: Excellent publication? R: Fellowship?
Member 1 Yes Yes Yes
Member 2 Yes No No
Member 3 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
The problem is that the majority rule produces inconsistent results.
While  a  majority  certifies  that  the  candidate  has  a  good  project  and
that publications of the candidate are excellent, there is no majority
to accept the candidate as a fellow. Based on the above propositions,
majority voting implies that premises P and Q are accepted whereas the
conclusion R is rejected.
Two ways to escape the paradox suggest themselves and have come
to dominate the debate. One can either confine aggregation to premises
and derive the conclusion deductively according to these premises (the
premise-based procedure);  or  an  individual  can  start  by  drawing  the
conclusion according to her individual assessment of the premises and
the  votes  on  the  conclusion  are  then  aggregated  (the conclusion-based
procedure). Note that both procedures adhere to the majority rule as an
essential standard of judgment aggregation; albeit, they restrict its use
to a proper subset of the judgments to prevent inconsistencies.
List and Pettit (2002) introduce a general result that extends
the discursive dilemma to a wider class of aggregation procedures. The
defining  property  of  this  class  is  “systematicity”  (List  and  Pettit  2002,
99),  which  requires  that  the  collective  acceptance  of  a  claim  depends
solely on the pattern of individual acceptance and not, for example, on
the content of the judgment or the evidence it is based on. To determine
the collective judgment of some claim it suffices to consider individual
votes  (whatever  the  claim  is).5 This  is  a  characteristic  of  all  voting
5 See List and Pettit 2003, 99; compare also the related but probably more transparent
characterization “systematic responsiveness” in List 2006, 376.
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procedures  that  are  based  solely  on  counting  votes.  Not  surprisingly,
the  debate  that  follows  from  this—and  other  attempts  to  generalise
the observation of inconsistency in the discursive dilemma—focuses on
both the variations and strengths of the majority rule as a truth-tracking
aggregation procedure.6
The root of the whole debate is the fundamental finding that using
the majority rule in aggregating individual judgment may result in
inconsistencies if several, logically connected judgments are at issue.
Yet,  those  participants  leading  the  debate  never  seem  to  seriously
consider that something might be fundamentally wrong with applying
the majority rule to matters of truth. Occasionally scholars recognise
tension between democratic procedures and the fundamental quest for
truth.7 But the general reaction to the discursive dilemma is not a closer
inspection  of  the  relation  between  truth  and  majority  voting  in
principle. Instead, alternative procedures are considered that constrain
majority voting to suitable selections of judgments or by quota rules
(Grossi and Pigozzi 2012). It is not the general truth-tracking capabilities
of the majority rule that are called into question, but rather the proper
pattern of its application.
To the outside observer this may appear somewhat strange. Two
related observations from the history of this body of thought might help
to better understand the approach taken in this debate.
First, one aspect of the debate (and a familiar domain for many of its
participants) stems from social choice theory. From the very beginning
the  standard  view  of  the  problem  has  included  elements  of  social
choice theory—such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem or the Condorcet
paradox—which are formally similar and were perceived as substantially
related. So, as an intuitive point of departure, the focus on voting with
the  majority  rule  was  transferred  from  social  choice  theory  to  social
epistemology.
Second, Condorcet’s jury theorem has always been understood as a
guiding background insight. Roughly, the theorem says that the majority
judgment on some yes/no issue by a group of N sufficiently competent
individuals is  more probably true than a single judgment by one of  its
members, and the probability of its truth approaches 1 as N increases.8
6 See, e.g., List 2005; Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006; Hartmann and Sprenger 2012.
7 See the distinction between procedural and epistemic democracy in List and Goodin
2001.
8 See, e.g., Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006 for an overview and generalizations of the
theorem.
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Looking at the theorem in this rough formulation, it may well seem that
the supremacy of the majority rule as a truth-tracking procedure is not
a matter of debate but a formally proven and indisputable result.
Notice, however, that Condorcet’s jury theorem states that the
majority rule outperforms individual judgment under certain
conditions, it does not say anything about how it relates to other
aggregation rules. Moreover, it is worthwhile to have a closer look at the
conditions, particularly at the assumption of sufficient competence.
This assumption could be specified as follows:  There is  a  p > 0.5,  such
that the probability that an individual judgment is true is at least p for
every individual in the group. The hidden assumption behind this
condition is that for every individual i there is a constant probability pi
that  one  of  his  judgments  is  correct,  independently  of  the  specific
content  of  the  judgment.  If  his  judgment  is  that  there  will  be  a
thunderstorm tomorrow, this will come true with probability pi; but if
his judgment would have been ‘no thunderstorm tomorrow’, this would
have indicated ‘no thunderstorm’ with probability pi as  well.  Whatever
an expert says about whatever issue has the same authority in terms of
truth.  As  we  will  see,  this  is  a  very  strong  condition,  which  cannot  be
assumed to be satisfied in general—not even among individuals whom
we unhesitatingly and rightly classify as competent experts.
One  aim of  this  paper  is  to  challenge  the  social  choice  perspective
and to sow some uneasiness regarding the majority rule when truth is at
stake.  This  will  be  done  in  a  much  simpler  context  than  that  of  the
discursive dilemma by way of illustrating a counterexample that focuses
on a single statement. But before this subversive task is undertaken,
I  will  introduce  some  formal  specifications  of  evidence  and  expert
knowledge to get a firm grip on the problem.
EVIDENCE
As is common in the debate about the discursive dilemma I will confine
my analysis to simple yes/no problems. An individual has evidence for
some proposition φ being true if he has information on some matter of
fact that is suitably related to the truth of φ.  A  convenient  example  is
evidence for prostate cancer. The PSA (Prostate-Specific Antigen) blood
level is the most common and—although contested to some extent—the
best prostate cancer marker available. Prostate cancer causes, as a rule,
a high PSA blood level, which can easily be detected. An increased PSA
blood level, however, can have other causes as well, e.g., prostatitis
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(prostate inflammation) or benign prostatic hyperplasia (a swelling of
the  prostate).  A  high  PSA  blood  level  is  evidence  for  prostate  cancer
because the probability of a high PSA blood level is significantly greater
in the event of prostate cancer than not.
Figure 1: An indicator model of evidence with two indicator states
Figure 1 shows an abstract model of the basic interrelations.
Call  this  an  indicator  model  of  evidence  in  a  yes/no  problem  with
two indicator states. An individual A is interested in knowing whether
φ (A has prostate cancer) or ¬φ (A does not have prostate cancer) is true.
His prior estimation of φ is p > 0. A is observing an indicator I (the PSA
blood level) with (as is assumed to simplify the problem) two indicator
states I1 (high  PSA  blood  level)  and  I2 (low PSA blood level). A can
correctly judge the state of the indicator, but he does not know whether
φ is  the  case,  i.e.,  he cannot discriminate between I1 on condition that
φ and  I1 on condition that ¬φ (indicated by the curved line connecting
the nodes I1|φ and  I1|¬φ).  However,  he  does  know  the  conditional
probabilities q1 = prob(I1|φ)  and  q2 = prob(I2|¬φ). It should be clear now
how the graph in Figure 1 represents the situation.9
Observing the indicator may provide information about φ to A.
Bayes’ rule describes how the information about φ is  conveyed  by
A’s observations. Given his basic information about the probabilistic
interrelations, A can update his initial probability estimate for φ being
true (prob(φ) = p) after observing I1 or I2:
9 The representation follows the conventions of the theory of dynamic games. In fact,
Figure  1  displays  the  game  form of  a  very  simple  interaction  in  which  nature  is  the
only player choosing over alternatives.
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prob(φ|Iଵ) = prob(Iଵ|φ)prob(φ)prob(Iଵ|φ)prob(φ) + 	prob(Iଵ|¬φ)prob(¬φ)= qଵpqଵp	 + (1 − p)(1 − qଶ) 	
prob(φ|Iଶ) = prob(Iଶ|φ)prob(φ)prob(Iଶ|φ)prob(φ) + 	prob(Iଶ|¬φ)prob(¬φ)= (1 − qଵ)p(1 − qଵ)p	+ (1 − p)qଶ 	
If the probability that φ is true rises after observing indicator state Ii
one  may  say  that  Ii indicates φ.  Or,  to  give  a  more  formal,  general
definition:
Definition 1. An event ω is said to indicate that ψ or to be evidence
for ψ iff prob(ψ|ω) > prob(ψ).
There is a convenient characterisation of I1 (i.e., the event of
observing I1) being evidence for φ in our indicator model of evidence:
Remark 1. Consider  an  indicator  model  of  evidence  in  a  yes/no
problem as represented in Figure 1.
I1 is evidence for φ ⇔  I2 is evidence for ¬φ ⇔  q1 + q2 > 1.
The proof is by simple algebra (see Appendix).
We  are  especially  interested  in  those  indicators  whose  indicator
states signal that the state of affairs they indicate is the most probable
state:
Definition 2. An  event ω is  said  to  be decisive for ψ iff
prob(ψ|ω) > 0.5.
Definition 3. In an indicator model of evidence in a yes/no problem
as represented in Figure 1, the indicator I is said to be decisive iff I1
is decisive for φ and I2 is decisive for ¬φ.
Here is a convenient characterisation of an indicator being decisive:
Remark 2. Consider an indicator model of evidence as represented in
Figure 1. With q* := q1p + q2(1–p), the following equivalences hold:





⇔ q* > 1–p
LAHNO / CHALLENGING THE MAJORITY RULE
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 63





⇔  q* > p.







⇔  q* > max{p; 1 – p}.
Again, the proof is by simple algebra (see Appendix).
Notice that q* represents the overall probability that the state of the
indicator I indicates the true state of affairs.
EXPERT JUDGMENTS
Expert judgments are fundamentally related to evidence in at least two
ways.
First,  an  expert  has  privileged  access  to  evidence.  She  is  a  person
who is in a particularly favourable situation to obtain information about
some  subject  and/or  who  is  particularly  competent  to  process  such
information. Call the circumstances that favour or disfavour the access
of some person to information on some subject her opportunity and
her capacity to process this information correctly her competence (see
Goldman 1999, 109). The evidence available to an expert is a function
of her opportunity and her competence. Whatever the particular
opportunity and competence of an expert may be, the evidence available
to her will ultimately be of the same basic form as any other evidence.
Thus,  if  an  expert  has  evidence  pertinent  a  yes/no  problem  it  may  be
provided  by  an  indicator  as  shown  in  the  model  above  (e.g.,  given  her
opportunity and competence, the expert may be in a position to observe
the PSA blood-level).
Second, an expert judgment about some subject is itself evidence of
or  for  the  subject.  If  an  expert  is  sufficiently  competent  and  has  the
opportunity to obtain relevant information about some subject (i.e., if
she  has  sufficient  evidence),  then  her  judgment  may  be  understood  as
an indicator on this subject.
Consider  an  expert  judgment  on  a  yes/no  problem with  the  expert
choosing between two options only: I1 = ‘yes, φ is true’ or I2 = ‘no, φ is
not true’. In presuming that competence and opportunity are sufficient,
this  judgment  is  evidence  for φ in  exactly  the  same  way  as  described
in  our  model  in  Figure  1,  with  q1 and  q2 jointly representing the
competence and opportunity of the expert. Moreover, if the evidence for
φ used  by  the  expert  is  based  on  a decisive indicator I* with indicator
states I1*  and  I2*, then the evidence given by the expert judgment is
formally identical and equivalent to the evidence the judgment is based
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on,  i.e.,  it  is  described  by  a  formally  identical  indicator  with  formally
identical indicator states and the same conditional probabilities.
Notice that the judgment of an expert may differ from his testimony.
An  expert  may  judge  that  such  and  such  is  the  case,  but  testify
something  else  for  various  reasons.  Testimony  may,  of  course,  still  be
evidence  of  or  for  some subject.  To  give  an  account  of  such  evidence,
not only are competence and opportunity to be included in the analysis
but also the properties of ‘honesty’ and ‘integrity’.10 I abstract away
the  related  strategic  problems  here  by  assuming  that  the  judgment  of
the  expert  is  correctly  communicated  and  can  be  correctly  assessed.
Thus,  my  analysis  concentrates  on  the  evidential  character  of  pure
judgment only.
If  two  or  more  experts  have  the  same competence  (with  respect  to
some issue φ)  and  are  in  the  same  general  position  to  obtain
information on the issue (i.e., have the same ‘opportunity’), then the
evidence provided by a judgment of one expert will be characterized by
the same conditional probabilities q1 and q2 as the evidence provided by
a  judgment  of  another  expert.  The  experts judge under equivalent
epistemic conditions relative to φ iff  their  judgment  on φ can  be
described by the same indicator model with identical parameters q1, q2,
and p.
If experts judge under equivalent epistemic conditions, their
judgments that φ should be assigned the same weight.  A judgment ‘φ’
of one expert represents exactly the same evidence for φ as a judgment
‘φ’ of another expert under equivalent epistemic conditions. But this
does not mean that a judgment in favour of φ should also have the
same  weight  as  a  judgment  for  ¬φ.  In  fact,  as  we  will  see  in  the  next
section,  an  expert  judgment  ‘φ’ may produce stronger support for
φ than  the  opposite  judgment  for  ¬φ under equivalent epistemic
conditions. This suggests that, in such cases, positive judgments should
have more weight than negative ones. But this is exactly what is
implicitly neglected by the assumptions behind Condorcet’s theorem
and explicitly ruled out by the systematicity condition.
10 See Lahno 2012. Goldman discriminates ‘opportunity’, ‘competence’, and ‘sincerity’
(or  ‘honesty’)  as  basic  determinants  of  testimonial  information.  He  does  not  make  a
distinction between integrity and honesty. See Goldman 1999, 109.
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ARE THERE SHARKS IN THE ISLAND WATERS?
We are now in a position to give a precise formulation of the majority
rule problem of expert judgments in simple yes/no problems:
Suppose an uneven number of m experts11 judge (independently)
under equivalent epistemic conditions on a decisive indicator as given in
Figure 1, with l experts judging ‘φ is true’ and m–l experts judging ‘¬φ is
true’: Is the indicator I* with indicator states I1* = ‘l > m–l ’ and I2* = ‘m–
l > l ’  decisive?  The  answer,  as  indicated  above,  is  ‘not  necessarily!’  A
simple counterexample demonstrates this.
Imagine  an  island  about  which  fishermen  are  interested  to  know
whether there are sharks in the waters (φ) or not (¬φ) before they go out
to work. Assume that the probability of sharks in the water is 10% (this
knowledge is shared by all fisherman):
prob(φ) = p = 0.1.
Also  assume  that  there  are  three  individuals,  each  of  which  are
located on top of one of the three hills on the island with excellent
panoptic  visibility.  If  sharks  are  in  the  waters,  sometimes  a  shark  fin
cuts across the surface of the sea (I1) and, therefore, may become visible
to an observer on one of the hills. Assume that the three ‘experts’ on the
hills share the same basic competence and opportunity in watching for
shark fins. If there are sharks in the waters (φ),  then for each of them,
independently of the other two, there is a 5% chance to spot a shark fin:
prob(I1|φ) = q1 = 0.05.
If there are no sharks (¬φ), no fin will be observed (I2):
prob(I2|¬φ) = q2 = 1.
For  each  observer  spotting  a  fin  is  evidence  for  sharks  being  in  the
water and spotting no fin is evidence for ‘no sharks’ (q1+q2 = 1.05 > 1).
Moreover, the evidence given to each observer is decisive (q* > 0.9).
So we have three experts independently (in the relevant sense)
judging under equivalent epistemic conditions on whether φ or  ¬φ is
true.  Each  of  the  three  judgments  is  evidence  for φ described  by  an
indicator model as in Figure 1 with identical parameters for all experts.
Suppose  expert  1  spots  a  fin  and  the  other  two  do  not.  Then  the
evidence suggests the presence of sharks:
11 We assume an uneven number of experts to avoid problems with ties.
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prob(φ| 1 observes I1 AND 2 observes I2 AND 3 observes I2) = 1.
But the majority of the experts judge ¬φ: No sharks!
A GENERAL RESULT
The  example  illustrates  that  the  aggregated  judgment  of  a  minority  of
experts  may  have  more  weight  than  the  majority  judgment  even  if  all
experts judge independently and under equivalent epistemic conditions.
One may suspect that the result is an exception, the consequence of an
extreme and exceptional parameter arrangement. A particularly striking
feature of our example is the assumption that q2 =  1:  if  there  is  no
shark, no fins will be seen. This assumption, in fact, simplifies the
problem dramatically. However, the force of the counterexample is not
necessitated by this peculiar assumption. The example maintains its
rebutting force if q2 is  changed  to  a  value  below  but  sufficiently  near
to 1.
There  is  a  general  mechanism  behind  the  example:  one  indicator
state  may  have  more  evidential  force  than  another;  if  this  is  the  case,
n observations of the first indicator may outweigh n+1 observations of
the second (for some integer n).
To be more precise, let us first specify what can plausibly be meant
by saying that one indicator state has ‘more weight’ than another.
Definition 4. Consider  an  indicator  model  of  evidence  in  a  yes/no
problem as represented in Figure 1. Let I1I2 denote the event that
two observations are independently made: I1 is  observed  first  and
I2 is  observed  second.  The  indicator  state I1 is  said  to have more
weight than the indicator state I2 iff the event I1I2 indicates φ, i.e., iff
prob(φ | I1I2) > p.
Here is a convenient characterisation:
Remark 3. Consider  an  indicator  model  of  evidence  as  given  in
Figure 1 with I1 being evidence for φ. Then:
I1 has more weight than I2 ⇔  q1(1–q1) > q2(1–q2) ⇔  q1 < q2.
We can now state our general result (see the Appendix for proofs):
Main proposition. Consider  an  indicator  model  of  evidence  in  a
yes/no problem as represented in Figure 1. Let I be decisive, let I1 be
evidence for φ and I2 evidence  for ¬φ.  For  any  integer  n,  let Iଵ௡Iଶ௡ାଵ
denote  the  event  that  2n+1  observations  are  independently  made,
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I1 is  observed  n  times  and I2 is  observed  n+1  times.  Then  the
following holds:
If I1 has more weight than I2 (i.e., q2 > q1) and q1 ≠ 0,  there  is  an
integer n0 such that for all n ≥ n0, Iଵ௡Iଶ௡ାଵ is decisive for φ.
If the indicator states have different weights, then there is always
a number n such that n expert judgments made with regard to
independent observations of the weightier indicator state will outweigh
a majority of n+1 judgments to the contrary by other experts.
CONCLUSION
The general question behind the problem discussed here is: How should
we aggregate or accumulate the evidence obtained by different expert
judgments? A seemingly natural suggestion seems to be: weigh the
evidence  of  any  single  expert  judgment  in  some  suitable  form
representing her competence and her access to the relevant information;
the total evidence then is determined by the weighted sum of the
evidence given by the total multitude of individual judgments. If expert
judgments come in the form of yes-or-no statements, and if all experts
possess  the  same  competence  and  have  equivalent  access  to  relevant
information, then this amounts to accepting that the aggregated
evidence  favours  the  statement  that  is  endorsed  by  a  majority.  The
simple counterexample and the main proposition in the last section
show  that  this  is  not  a  good  way  to  aggregate  the  expert  evidence  in
general.
The  indicator  model  of  evidence  suggests  a  different  way  to
aggregate expert evidence, namely by updating probability judgments
according to Bayes’ rule. In simple situations, similar to those analysed
in this paper, this aggregation method will also amount to counting
votes and forming judgment based on a simple number rule:
Let all experts independently judge under equivalent epistemic
conditions  and  let  expert  judgments  be  aggregated  according  to
Bayes’  rule.  If  l  denotes  the  number  of  experts  that  testify φ, then
there is a number k such that ‘l > k’ is decisive for φ.
In the example above k = 0. Notice that k not only depends on q1 and
q2;  it  is  also  dependent  on  the  prior  probability  p  =  prob(φ).  So  it  will
change  in  the  process  of  learning  about φ as more and more evidence
is accumulated. The amount of confirmative expertise needed to believe
a certain proposition φ is dependent upon the sort of claim that φ states
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and  on  its  prior  credibility.  There  is  no  general  ratio  of  ‘yes’  to  ‘no’
testimonies that can be used as a reliable decision rule when it comes to
believing or disbelieving a statement.
How does all this relate to the fundamental role of the majority rule
in  theories  of  judgment  aggregation?  I  will  conclude  with  two  short
remarks to this question.
First, the alleged foundation rests on the assumption that the
amount of affirmation that is needed to justify a belief in a certain claim
should not depend on the nature of the claim at stake.  This  is  the
essence  of  the  condition  of  systematicity  in  Pettit  and  List’s  (2002)
impossibility  result  concerning  the  discursive  dilemma.  When  spelled
out and made explicit in this way it loses much of its initial plausibility.
If  I  see  a  shark  this  is  better  evidence  for  the  proposition  ‘there  are
sharks’  than  not  seeing  sharks  is  for  ‘no  sharks’.  And  this  is  not  a
peculiarity of the example given here. The idea that the weight given to
an affirmation should be the same for all claims independently of their
specific content is also embodied by the common assumption (of most
versions) of Condorcet’s jury theorem that the competence of a juror is
defined by one single and constant probability  p of  judging correctly.12
Again, the example shows that this may not be appropriate. The
probability that somebody who judges that there are no sharks on
the basis that he did not observe one is wrong may well be larger than
the probability of being wrong when judging the presence of sharks on
the  basis  of  observation.  As  statisticians  would  claim:  the  probability
of an error of type 1 may not be identical to the probability of a type 2
error.  And  we  know  from  many  contexts  such  as  medical  diagnostics
that  type  1  and  type  2  errors  are,  in  fact,  not  equally  probable.  In  our
model  the  probability  of  type  1  and  type  2  errors  are  represented  by
q1 and q2. The general result, thus, shows that whenever the type 1 and
type 2 errors are not equally likely, we have a good reason to mistrust
the majority rule in aggregating expert judgments.
Second,  democracy  is  a  normative  standard  in  defining  collective
measures on the basis of individual interests. Individual opinions cannot
have the same fundamental role in epistemology. Whereas interests
are the ultimate, independent reference points in politics, opinions and
judgments ought to be assessed in terms of a single more fundamental
criterion: truth. Democracy (or the majority rule) and truth are not
necessarily related. To be sure: the majority may (and often does)
12 Kirchstein and Wangenheim 2010 is an exception to this rule.
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indicate truth. But this is a contingent relationship that calls for critical
investigation  and  cautious  assessment  on  the  basis  of  all  relevant
circumstances.
APPENDIX
Proof of Remark 1.Iଵ	is	evidence		for		φ ⇔ qଵpqଵp + (1 − p)(1 − qଶ) > p
⇔ qଵ > qଵp + (1 − p)(1 − qଶ)			
⇔ qଵ > 	1 − qଶ ⇔	qଵ + qଶ > 	1.	
Iଶ	is	evidence	for		¬φ ⇔ (1 − p)qଶ(1 − qଵ)p + (1 − p)qଶ > 1 − p
⇔ qଶ > (1 − qଵ)p + (1 − p)qଶ						
⇔ qଶ > 	1 − qଵ ⇔	qଵ + qଶ > 	1.			
	
Proof of Remark 2.prob(φ|Iଵ) > 0.5 ⇔ qଵpqଵp + (1 − p)(1 − qଶ) > 12	
⇔ 2qଵp > qଵp + (1 − p)(1 − qଶ)	
⇔ qଵp + qଶ(1 − p) > 1 − p ⇔	1 − qଶqଵ < p1 − p .
	
prob(¬φ|Iଶ) > 0.5 ⇔ (1 − p)qଶ(1 − qଵ)p + (1 − p)qଶ > 12				
⇔ 2(1 − p)qଶ > (1 − qଵ)p + (1 − p)qଶ				
⇔ qଵp + qଶ(1 − p) > p ⇔	 p1 − p < qଶ1 − qଵ.							
	
The third equivalence is a combination of the first two equivalences.
Proof of Remark 3.
From Bayes’ rule we get:prob(φ|IଵIଶ) = qଵ(1 − qଵ)pqଵ(1 − qଵ)p	 + 	qଶ(1 − qଶ)(1 − p).	
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Then:prob(φ|IଵIଶ) > p ⇔ qଵ(1 − qଵ)pqଵ(1 − qଵ)p	 + 	qଶ(1 − qଶ)(1 − p) > p	
⇔ qଵ(1 − qଵ) > qଵ(1 − qଵ)p	 + 	qଶ(1 − qଶ)(1 − p)	
⇔ qଵ(1 − qଵ)(1 − p) > qଶ(1 − qଶ)(1 − p)		
⇔ qଵ(1 − qଵ) > qଶ(1 − qଶ).
	
Remember that I1 is evidence for φ, and thus q1+q2 > 1. Therefore:prob(φ|IଵIଶ) > p ⇔ qଵ(1 − qଵ) > qଶ(1 − qଶ)	
⇔ qଵ − qଶ > qଵଶ − qଶଶ 	
⇔ qଵ − qଶ > (qଵ − qଶ)(qଵ + qଶ)		
⇔ (qଵ − qଶ > 0	 ∧ 	1 > qଵ + qଶ)
									∨ 	(qଵ − qଶ < 0	 ∧ 	1 < qଵ + qଶ)
⇔ qଵ < qଶ.
	
Proof of Main proposition.
From Bayes’ rule we get:prob(φ|Iଵ௡Iଶ௡ାଵ) > 0.5 ⇔ qଵ௡(1 − qଵ)௡ାଵpqଵ௡(1 − qଵ)௡ାଵp	 + 	qଶ௡ାଵ(1 − qଶ)௡(1 − p) > .5	
⇔ qଵ௡(1 − qଵ)௡ାଵp > qଶ௡ାଵ(1 − qଶ)௡(1 − p)	
⇔
p
1 − p > ൬qଶ(1 − qଶ)qଵ(1 − qଵ)൰௡ ∙ qଶ1 − qଵ
From Remark 3, we know that
୯మ(ଵି୯మ)
୯భ(ଵି୯భ) < 1, so there is an n0 such that
for all n > n
0
 the inequality holds.
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